Originally written in September 2004.
Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, sat on the board of ABB Combustion Engineering from 1990 through 2000. During seven of these ten years, ABB aggressively sought to secure a contract with North Korea to build nuclear reactors. During this same period of time, in a blatant conflict of interest, Donald Rumsfeld headed the Rumsfeld Commission which looked into the growing ballistic missile threat.
In 1993, ABB entered bids to build two nuclear reactors in Yonggwang-kun, a southern province in North Korea. In 1996, the U.S. Department of Energy approved ABB-CE to participate in the construction of two “light-water” nuclear reactors in North Korea. In 1997, the first three contracts between ABB and North Korea were signed. These involved technology agreements, and the “design and manufacture of advanced pressurized water reactor systems technology”.
In 1999, ABB was voted one of the world’s 100 Best-Managed Companies by IndustryWeek. This was a momentous occasion for ABB since no technology and engineering company had ever made the list before. The criteria on which the company was selected is indicative of a management team and board who are making appropriate decisions for sustained company growth.
In January 2000, ABB won the contract worth $200 million (USD) to build two light-water nuclear reactors on the east coast of North Korea. The years of negotiation and partnering had paid off.
But during this same period of time (1997/98) Donald Rumsfeld was heading the Rumsfeld Commission to analyze the growing threat of ballistic missile use against the U.S. In the final report issued by Mr. Rumsfeld’s commission, the following statements are made:
Concerted efforts by a number of overtly or potentially hostile nations to acquire ballistic missiles with biological or nuclear payloads pose a growing threat to the United States, its deployed forces and its friends and allies. These newer, developing threats in North Korea, Iran and Iraq are in addition to those still posed by the existing ballistic missile arsenals of Russia and China, nations with which we are not now in conflict but which remain in uncertain transitions.
The extraordinary level of resources North Korea and Iran are now devoting to developing their own ballistic missile capabilities poses a substantial and immediate danger to the U.S., its vital interests and its allies. While these nations’ missile programs may presently be aimed primarily at regional adversaries, they inevitably and inescapably engage the vital interests of the U.S. as well. Their targeted adversaries include key U.S. friends and allies. U.S. deployed forces are already at risk from these nations’ growing arsenals. Each of these nations places a high priority on threatening U.S. territory, and each is even now pursuing advanced ballistic missile capabilities to pose a direct threat to U.S. territory.
a. North Korea
There is evidence that North Korea is working hard on the Taepo Dong 2 (TD-2) ballistic missile. The status of the system’s development cannot be determined precisely. Nevertheless, the ballistic missile test infrastructure in North Korea is well developed. Once the system is assessed to be ready, a test flight could be conducted within six months of a decision to do so. If North Korea judged the test to be a success, the TD-2 could be deployed rapidly. It is unlikely the U.S. would know of such a decision much before the missile was launched. This missile could reach major cities and military bases in Alaska and the smaller, westernmost islands in the Hawaiian chain. Light-weight variations of the TD-2 could fly as far as 10,000 km, placing at risk western U.S. territory in an arc extending northwest from Phoenix, Arizona, to Madison, Wisconsin. These variants of the TD-2 would require additional time to develop and would likely require an additional flight test.
North Korea has developed and deployed the No Dong, a medium range ballistic missile (MRBM) using a scaled-up Scud engine, which is capable of flying 1,300 km. With this missile, North Korea can threaten Japan, South Korea, and US bases in the vicinity of the DPRK. North Korea has reportedly tested the No Dong only once, in 1993. The Commission judges that the No Dong was operationally deployed long before the U.S. Government recognized that fact. There is ample evidence that North Korea has created a sizable missile production infrastructure, and therefore it is highly likely that considerable numbers of No Dongs have been produced.
In light of the considerable difficulties the Intelligence Community encountered in assessing the pace and scope of the No Dong missile program, the U.S. may have very little warning prior to the deployment of the Taepo Dong 2.
North Korea maintains an active WMD program, including a nuclear weapon program. It is known that North Korea diverted material in the late 1980s for at least one or possibly two weapons. North Korea’s ongoing nuclear program activity raises the possibility that it could produce additional nuclear weapons. North Korea also possesses biological weapons production and dispensing technology, including the capability to deploy chemical or biological warheads on missiles.
North Korea also poses a major threat to American interests, and potentially to the United States itself, because it is a major proliferator of the ballistic missile capabilities it possesses-missiles, technology, technicians, transporter-erector-launchers (TELs) and underground facility expertise-to other countries of missile proliferation concern. These countries include Iran, Pakistan and others. [Emphasis added]
In February, 2003, the Swiss news agency Swissinfo reported on this conflict of interest. Wolfram Eberhardt, spokesman for ABB, informed Swissinfo that Rumsfeld had been present at “nearly all the board meetings” during his tenure on ABB’s Board of Directors. But would not confirm nor deny that the seven years of negotiations, contracts and work with North Korea on nuclear reactors had ever “been before the board”.
In May of 2003, the Guardian wrote an article on Mr. Rumsfeld’s former position on ABB’s board. When Rumsfeld’s office was asked about his knowledge of the contract signed in 2000 between ABB and North Korea, his spokesperson stated:
…the defence secretary did not “recall it being brought before the board at any time”.
References
1. 1993 ABB Bids for North Korean Reactor Construction
2. 1996 Government Approval for ABB
3. 1997 Agreements Signed
4. ABB Selected by IndustryWeek
5. 2000 ABB Signs Agreement with North Korea
6. Rumsfeld Commission Report
7. 2001 Rumsfeld Resigns ABB Board Position
8. SwissInfo Article
9. Guardian Article
